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Abstract—Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA), in which
attackers emulate primary user signals causing restriction of sec-
ondary access on the attacked channels, is a serious security prob-
lem in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs). An user performing
a PUEA for selfishly occupying more channels is called a selfish
PUEA attacker. Network managers could adopt a surveillance
process on disallowed channels for identifying illegal channel
occupation of selfish PUEA attackers and hence mitigating selfish
PUEA. Determining surveillance strategies, particularly in multi-
channel context, is necessary for ensuring network operation
fairness. In this paper, we formulate a game, called multi-channel
surveillance game, between the selfish attack and the surveillance
process in multi-channel CRNs. The sequence-form representation
method is adopted to determine the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of
the game. We show that performing the obtained NE surveillance
strategy significantly mitigates selfish PUEA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio (CR) is introduced as a solution to improve
spectrum utilization by enabling secondary access to licensed
spectrum. Discovering spectrum holes is therefore essential. To
explore the spectrum opportunities, there are two approaches:
spectrum sensing and database-driven. In the spectrum sensing
approach, the primary users’ activity is explored by measur-
ing the spectrum environment, while in the database-driven
approach, the information of spectrum usage for CR users
is provided by a database server. Compared to the database-
driven approach, the spectrum sensing approach is cheaper
and more flexible for a wide range of networks [1]. However,
spectrum sensing faces a serious security risk: Primary User
Emulation Attack (PUEA) [2]–[8]. In PUEA, the attacker
transmits an emulated Primary User (PU) signal which could
lead to disallowed state on the attacked channels (i.e., the
channels which spectrum sensing system claims to be busy
after the sensing period). The attacker therefore gains exclusive
spectrum right. Depending on goals, PUEA can be categorized
into two types: selfish and malicious. A malicious PUEA
targets at ruining the operation of networks, hence it is similar
to the jamming attack or the denial-of-service attack. A selfish
PUEA, however, aims at selfishly occupying the attacked
channel for data transmission. In that sense, selfish PUEA
is associated with an illegal benefit degrading the fairness of
CR Networks (CRNs) and possible interference threating to
primary systems. In this study, we therefore focus on how to
mitigate the selfish PUEA on CNRs.
Several earlier works have investigated the issues of selfish
PUEA. Most of them adopt detection methods based on
additional information, such as the locations of both primary
and secondary users [2] or the frequency deviation feature of
FM signal [4] to identify the PUEA attackers. However, those
methods are only applicable on special cases where added in-
formation, or the imperfection of attacked signals is available.
The other works applied the game-theoretical framework to
analyze the risk of PUEA [5]–[10] since there are the opposing
objectives between the attacker and the network manager.
In [5], the authors formulate a non-cooperative multistage
game between a selfish PUEA attacker and a secondary node
on the data transmission phase. A dogfight spectrum game
between a PUEA attacker and a CR user is formulated in [6].
In that work, PUEA attacking signals are treated as jamming
signals and channel hopping is proposed as a solution for
mitigating PUEAs. However, there is still vulnerability if the
attacker conducts multiple channel attacks.
A successful selfish PUEA is usually followed by selfishly
using of the attacked channel by the attacker. Therefore, it is
possible to determine the illegal accessing in any communi-
cation link through the users identification. In our previous
works [7], [8], we have proposed a surveillance process to
mitigate the influence of selfish PUEA by monitoring data
traffic at the beginning of the data frame on an occupied
channel. To determine the surveillance strategy of the network
manager, we use a game-theoretic approach to formulate the
relation between the attack and the surveillance process in
a single channel. The best strategies of the attacker and the
network manager are figured out in closed-form, as a Nash
equilibrium (NE) point. However, CRNs usually work on
multiple frequency bands, and because of the rapid expansion
of software-defined radio, the attacker can launch multi-
channel selfish PUEA. For such a case, a sequential monitoring
plan can be used, however, at the cost of long surveillance
time. In this paper, we therefore consider the multi-channel
surveillance process to mitigate the influence of the selfish
PUEA in CRNs.
The multi-channel surveillance model is more complicated
but more realistic than the single-channel model. We formulate
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the relation between the selfish PUEA and the surveillance
process as a two-player game in extensive form and consider
the Nash Equilibrium (NE) for the surveillance strategy. Note
that this approach can be extended to mitigate the influence
of malicious PUEA or unknown-attacking PUEA in CRNs.
Typically, the network manager observes the attacker’s
action only indirectly, through the sensing results. Hence,
the formulated game is an incomplete and imperfect infor-
mation game. Finding a Nash equilibrium solution in this
game is more complicated than in perfect-information games.
We employ the sequence-form representation method [11],
[12] instead of the conventional (benchmark) strategic-form
representation method [13] to determine the best strategy for
the defender and the attacker. We prove that the sequence-
form representation is much more efficient than the strategic-
form representation method. We then analyze and interpret the
impact of the system parameters includes the PU’s presence
probabilities, the network demand, as well as the penalty factor
on the obtained NE strategies.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We call the attacker, the representative of PUEA users and
the defender, the resource manager of the network which
monitors the traffic on disallowed channels to detect selfish
attackers. Let N be the number of available channels, M be
the maximum number of channels that the attacker can attack
and L be the maximum number of channels that the defender
can monitor.
The timing frame for network operation is the same as our
previous work (Figure 1 in [7]). Before the transmission (data
phase), a sensing phase, possibly followed by a surveillance
phase, is carried out. For each channel, because of the non-
ideal sensors, two possible sensing results could be obtained:
“allowed”, and “disallowed”. An attacker can implement a
selfish PUEA by transmitting the emulated primary user
signals during the sensing time. We assume the sensors
cannot distinguish the emulated and authentic primary signals.
Consequently, the PUEA will not be detected in the sensing
time. During a PUEA, the attacker cannot know the true status
of the primary user on the attacked channel since it cannot
sense for PU signal at the same time. This means the PUEA
attacker conducts the attack in a blind condition regarding the
primary signal status. Considering the defense against selfish
PUEA threats, we assume that a fixed format data frame is
used for exchanging data with all CR users including selfish
users. The format contains the identifying information of a
user such as the medium access control address. Therefore,
CR users can be identified by observing transmitted signals in
data time. Channel surveillance processes which are conducted
on monitored secondary access channels can identify the
selfish attackers if they are presented. Once a selfish attacker
has been detected, punishments such as network isolation or
bandwidth limitation can be adopted to penalize the attacker.
This surveillance process is assumed to be implemented by
the resource manager.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS (AT i CHANNEL)
Notation Meaning
pii The presence probability of PU.
piN The probability that the sensor answers disallowed channel
when the attacker does not attack.
piA The probability that sensor answers disallowed channel when
the attacker attacks.
ρiN The probability that the channel is not used by the PU while
the sensor claims disallowed and the attacker does not attack.
ρiA The probability that the channel is not used by the PU while
the sensor claims disallowed and the attacker attacks.
CiA The implementing cost of the selfish PUEA.
GiA The using gain of selfish PUEA attacker at one data frame.
CiS The monitoring cost of the resource manager at the channel.
GiM The capturing gain for detecting illegal attack during the
surveillance process of data frame.
P i The penalty value for being captured at the channel.
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Fig. 1. Two-channel surveillance game
Before the analysis, we summarize the specific notations
that will be used throughout the paper (Table I).
III. GAME FORMULATION
We formulate a two-player game in extensive form, called
the multi-channel surveillance game (MSG), to present the
relationship between the multi-channel surveillance process
and the selfish PUEA in CRNs. There are two players:
Attacker (player 1) who represents selfish PUEA attackers,
and Defender (player 2) who represents the resource manager.
Figure 1 illustrates the MSG game for a CRN with two
channels (N = 2), the attack capability of the attacker M = 1
and the monitoring capability of the defender L = 1.
1) Strategies: We denote by A∅, A1, A2, . . . , AK1 the ac-
tions of the attacker, where A∅ corresponds to the action
No Attack and Ai corresponds to the action Attack of a
non-empty subset of available channels. The attacker has K1
actions leading to its pure strategy set ΣA.
ΣA = {A∅, A1, A2, . . . , AK1} (1)
where K1 =
∑min(M,N)
i=1
(
N
i
)
.
Let C be the set of the sensing result of all channels
and C includes 2N elements. For a sensing result Ck ∈ C
(k = 0, . . . , 2N − 1), let |Ck| be the number of the disallowed
channels. We denote by D∅|Ck , D1|Ck , D2|Ck , . . . , D|Ck||Ck
the possible actions of the defender in which D∅|Ck corre-
sponds to the No Surveillance action and Dj|ck corresponds to
the Surveillance action of a disallowed channel subset belong
Ck. The pure strategy set of the defender has K2 actions
leading to its pure strategy set ΣD.
ΣD =
2N−1⋃
k=0
{D∅|Ck , D1|Ck , D2|Ck , . . . , D|Ck||Ck}Ck∈C, (2)
and K2 = 1 +
min(N,L)∑
m=1
m∑
n=1
(
m
n
)× (Nm).
We denote by ∆A the mixed strategy set of the attacker and
∆D the mixed strategy set of the defender.
2) Expected payoff: After sensing phase, there are two
possible sensing results for t channel: 1) disallowed and
2) allowed. Depending on the action of two players, their
payoffs at t channel are presented in Table II. These payoffs
are computed by considering the present of PU which is
represented by the values of ρiA and ρ
i
N .
TABLE II
PAYOFFS OF THE ATTACKER AND THE DEFENDER AT t CHANNEL
[Defender;Attacker] No Attack Attack
Disallowed No Surveillance [0;0] [0;−C
t
A + ρ
t
AG
t
A]
Surveillance [−CtS ;0] [−CtS + ρtAGtS ;−CtA − ρtAP t]
Allowed No Surveillance [0;0] [0;−CtA]
We denote by U
t,Dk|Cj
A the obtained payoff of the attacker
by performing the Attack of t channel while the defender plays
Dk|Cj . Similarly, we denote by U
Ai,t
D the obtained payoff
of the defender by monitoring t channel while the attacker
plays Ai. For the action pair {Ai, Dj|Ck}, the payoffs of the
defender U
Ai,Dk|Cj
D and the attacker U
Ai,Dk|Cj
A are given by
U
Ai,Dk|Cj
A =
∑
t∈Ai U
t,Dk|Cj
A (3)
U
Ai,Dk|Cj
D =
∑
t∈Dk|Cj U
Ai,t
D (4)
We denote by ΩA the expected payoff of the attacker and
ΩD the expected payoff of the defender, respectively. We have
ΩD =
K1∑
i=1
δa (Ai)
2N−1∑
j=0
pCj |Ai
|Cj |∑
k=1
δd(Dk|Cj )U
Ai,Dk|Cj
D (5)
ΩA =
K1∑
i=1
δa (Ai)
2N−1∑
j=0
pCj |Ai
|Cj |∑
k=1
δd(Dk|Cj )U
Ai,Dk|Cj
A (6)
where pCj |Ai is the probability of the sensing result Cj
under the attacker’s action Ai and δa (Ai) ∈ ∆A and
δd(Dk|Cj ) ∈ ∆D are the mixed strategy of action Ai and
Dk|Cj , respectively.
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
For the MSG game, we explore the Nash equilibrium (NE)
point, i.e., the point where each player has selected a best
response (BR) strategy to other players’ strategies. The BR
are the strategies on which the player gains the highest payoff
given other players’ strategies. A NE strategy may be a
”pure” or a ”mixed” strategy. To determine the NE point, two
approaches are considered: 1) the conventional strategic-form
representation and 2) the sequence-form representation.
A. Strategic-form representation
We first consider the conventional strategic-form represen-
tation, which is based on the Harsanyi transformation [13]
and the Lemke-Howson (L-H) algorithm [14]. The Harsanyi
transformation models all possible actions of a player, which
are affected by the other players’ actions and the nature
choices. For the MSG game, however, the method results in an
exponential increment in the size of the game. In particular, the
size of payoff matrix in the MSG game adopting the strategic-
form representation is (K1 + 1)×K3, where K3 is given by
K3 =
2N−1∏
k=0
( |Ck|
min (M, |Ck|)
)
(7)
where
(
N
k
)
denote a binomial coefficient indexed by N and k.
For the case that M = L = 1, K3 = K∗3 =
N∏
k=0
(k + 1)(
N
k).
It means that, the payoff matrix is 3 × 12 if N = 2 and
5× (5× 126) if N = 4. It is significantly larger when M and
L bigger than 1. Consequently, it is very complicated to find
the NE points of the game for the large N .
B. Sequence-form representation
In game theory, an extensive form game includes the infor-
mation about the sequencing of players’ possible moves, the
chance moves, payoffs for both players at the leaves and the
information set at the decision nodes. If the game is perfect
recall, i.e. each player remembers its’ earlier moves, each
node has a unique path from the root. Such a game can be
represented in the sequence-form where a sequence is defined
as a string listing the action choices of a particular player.
In detail, for each node h of player i, we define σh as the
sequence and Ch as the set of choices of player i at h. For
each choice c ∈ Ch, the corresponding sequence of i is σhc.
Hence, the set of sequences Σi for player i is given by
Σi = {∅} ∪ {σhc|h ∈ Hi, c ∈ Ch} (8)
where Hi is the set of node of player i.
Since the MSG game is a perfect recall game, we adopt
the sequence-form representation to solve the game. The trick
here is that we consider the sensing results as the elements
of the attacker’s sequence. The sequence strategy set of the
attacker then is
ΣseqA = {σAi, i = 1...K4}
=
{∅, A∅, A1, . . . , AK1 , A∅,C0 , A∅,C1 , . . .} (9)
where K4 = 1 + (K1 + 1) + (K1 + 1)× 2N .
The corresponding sequence strategy set of the defender is
ΣseqD = {σDj , j = 1... (K2 + 1)}
=
{∅, D∅|Ck , D1|Ck , . . . , D|Ck||Ck , . . .}Ck∈C (10)
The mixed strategy for the sequence-form representation is
presented by the probability of each sequence in the sequence
strategy set. Let ΦA and ΦD denote the mixed sequence
strategies for the attacker and the defender, respectively. From
the definition of the sequence strategy set, we have
ΦseqD = {φid}i=1...(K2+1) (11)
ΦseqA = {φja}j=1...K4 (12)
where φia is the probability of the attacker’s i
th sequence, φjd
is the probability of the defender’s jth sequence.
The relation between these mixed strategies is called the
realization plan. By default, for an empty sequence, the
probability is 1. For any node h, the mixed strategy of the
sequence at h is the sum of all mixed strategies from h.
Therefore, we obtain the realization plans for the defender
and the attacker:
φd (∅) = 1
φd
(
D∅|Ck
)
+
∑|Ck|
i=1 φd
(
Di|Ck
)
= 1 ∀Ck ∈ C
0 ≤ φid ≤ 1, i = 1 . . .K2
(13)
and 
φa (∅) = 1
φa (A∅) +
∑K1
i=1 φa (Ai) = 1∑2N−1
i=0 φa
(
A∅,Ci
)
= φa (A∅)
...∑2N−1
i=0 φa (AK1,Ci) = φa (AK1)
0 ≤ φia ≤ 1, i = 1 . . .K4
(14)
In general, these realization plans can be re-written using the
following matrix form.{
EΦA = e
ΦA ≥ 0 , and
{
FΦD = f
ΦD ≥ 0 , (15)
where E and F are called the constraint matrices, and e and
f are vectors in which the first element is 1, and the other
elements are 0.
As defined above, each leaf of the game tree corresponds to
a pair of sequences. Hence, for a pair of the sequence strategies
(σAi, σDj), there are 3 cases: i) if a pair of sequences is ended
at a leaf, the payoffs are computed by multiplying (3) and (4)
with the corresponding probability of the change move leads
to this leaf, ii) if a pair of sequences does not correspond to
a leaf, the payoffs are zero and iii) if a pair of sequences
corresponds to the leaves and consist the chance moves or the
information set, the payoff is then the sum over all leaves that
define the given pair of sequences.
Let ΠA and ΠD denote the payoff matrix of the attacker
and the defender in the sequence-form representation. The
expected payoffs of the attacker ΩA and the defender ΩD
therefore are computed by
ΩA = Φ
T
AΠAΦD (16)
ΩD = Φ
T
AΠDΦD (17)
An equilibrium is a pair (ΦA,ΦD) of mutual best responses.
In particular, if the realization plan ΦD is fixed, then ΦA is
the best response to ΦD if and only if it is an optimal solution
of the linear program
maximize
ΦA
ΦTA (ΠAΦD)
subject to EΦA = e
0 ≤ ΦA ≤ 1
(18)
The dual form of linear program (21) is as follows.
minimize
p
eTp
subject to ETp ≥ ΠAΦD
ΦTA
(−ΠAΦD + ETp) = 0 (19)
A similar program is established for the attacker strategy.
In conclusion, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium
can be formulated as follows:
minimize
p
eTp
minimize
q
fTq
subject to ETp ≥ ΠAΦD, FTq ≥ ΠTDΦD
ΦTA
(−ΠAΦD + ETp) = 0
ΦTD
(−ΠTDΦA + FTq) = 0
EΦA = e
FΦD = f
ΦA ≥ 0
ΦD ≥ 0
(20)
The value of p,q,ΦA,ΦD that satisfies the constraints
in (20) can be found through the Linear Complementary
Programing (LCP) [15] by introducing the non-negative vector
z =
(
ΦA,ΦD,p
′
,p
′′
,q
′
,q
′′
)T
where p
′
,p
′′
and q
′
,q
′′
are
non-negative vectors of the same dimension as p = p
′ − p′′
and q = q
′ − q′′ . Furthermore, we let
M =

0 −ΠA ET −ET 0 0
−ΠDT 0 0 0 0 −FT
−E 0 0 0 0 0
−E 0 0 0 0 0
0 −F 0 0 0 0
0 −F 0 0 0 0
 (21)
and bT =
(
0, 0, e, −e, f , −f )T . Then, we have
the LCP problem as follows:
find z
s.t Mz + b ≥ 0
zT (Mz + b) = 0
z ≥ 0
(22)
The LCP problem above could be solved by the Lemke algo-
rithm [11], [12], [15]. The main idea of the Lemke algorithm is
to apply the pivoting operation in the complementary problem.
A more detailed description can be found in [15]. Since
a feasible solution at least exists for the formulated LCP
problem [11], hence the solution of (20) could be found by
considering the solution of (22). This solution is the NE point
of the game. We have the following propositions.
Proposition 1: In the MSG game, the payoff matrix’s size
in the sequence-form representation is much smaller than the
payoff matrix’s size in the strategic-form representation.
Proof: We observe the payoff matrix in the sequence-
form representation is much smaller than one in the strategic-
form because K4  K3. In particular, the payoff matrix in
the sequence-form is linear in the size of the game whereas
the payoff matrix in the strategic-form is generally exponen-
tial. For example, we consider for a CRN with the number
of available channels N = 4 where the attack capability of
the attacker and the surveillance capability of the defender
M = L = 1. The size of the corresponding payoff matrix is
86× 48, which is much smaller than one with the strategic-
form representation (5× (5× 126)).
Remark 1: Below are some results from Proposition 1.
• The strategy space of the sequence-form representation
is exponentially smaller than the strategy space of the
strategic-form representation. Since the two methods op-
erate similarly [11], [12], the run time of each algorithm
depends on the size of the input. Thus, it is exponentially
faster to run the Lemke algorithm on the sequence-form
than the LH algorithm on the strategic-form.
• Since the sequence-form representation is much more
compact than the strategic-form representation, we there-
fore adopt the sequence-form representation approach to
determine the NE strategy of the MSG game.
Proposition 2: If L ≥ N , the NE point of the MSG
game is unique and corresponds to the combination result of
N independent single-channel surveillance games (results in
our previous work [7]), each with one channel in the set of
available channels.
Proof: (sketch) We consider the CRN with N available
channels. When L ≥ Nm the defender can perform to surveil-
lance on all disallowed channels. In this case, it is equivalent
to perform single-channel surveillance game of all disallowed
channels independently. For each single-channel surveillance
game, the NE point is unique and has been figured out in [7].
Therefore, the NE point of the MSG game with L ≥ N is
unique and could be determined by combining N unique NE
points of N single-channel surveillance games.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In order to analyze the impact of system parameters to
the NE point of the MSG game, the numerical computations
are conducted in Matlab with the Gambit toolbox [16] for
game theory. We also assume the sensing system adopts
the energy detection method and the average SNRs of the
primary signal received at sensor are −10dB. The false alarm
probability is Pf = 0.1 and the number of samples in the
energy detector is Nsample = 1500. The detection probability
(Pd) is then computed through the Constant false alarm rate
(CFAR) criterion. To focus on the NE strategy of the game,
we assume there is no difference between channels in the
attacking costs and in the monitoring gains, and only consider
the most significant case GiA > C
i
A ∀i = 1 . . . N (i.e., the
using gain is higher than the attacking cost of a channel).
We introduce the parameters: i) The penalty factor kC : the
ratio between the penalty and the using gain kC = P i/GiA,
ii) the network demand kb: the ratio between the surveillance
gain and the penalty kb = GiS/P
i. In addition, we denote by
kA the ratio between the attacking cost and the using gain (i.e.,
kA = C
i
A/G
i
A), kS the ratio between the monitoring cost and
the using gain (i.e., kS = CiS/G
i
A).
We first consider the CRN with difference cases of channel
numbers N . Table III shows the computational time to deter-
mine the NE point of the MSG game by using the sequence-
form method and the strategic-form method. The numerical
programs are conducted on a Dell Precision M6700 laptop
with Intel Core i7 CPUs 2.6 GHz. For N = 2, two methods use
the same run time to determine the NE strategy of the game.
For N = 3, however, the sequence method method is much
faster than the strategic-form method. For N > 3, strategic-
form method is unable to provide results while the sequence-
form method is feasible. We therefore adopt the sequence-form
method to determine the NE strategy of the MSG game.
TABLE III
THE COMPUTATION TIME TO DETERMINE THE NE POINT.
N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5
Strategic-form 2 s 1960.7 s ∞ ∞
Sequence-form 2 s 32.4 s 11564 s ∼ 12 h
Next, for illustrating the effect of parameters on NE strategy
of the MSG game, we consider a CRN with two available
channels (N = 2), the attack capability of attacker M = 1 and
the monitoring capability of the defender L = 1. We assume
that kA = 0.2, kS = 0.1, pi1 = 0.2 and pi2 = 0.5.
Fig. 2a, Fig. 2b and Fig. 2c present the NE strategy of
the MSG game for low penalty (kC = 0.4), medium penalty
(kC = 2) and high penalty (kC = 10), respectively. To
provide a better view, we only plot the NE strategies of the
attack actions and the surveillance actions. We observe that
for each the penalty factors kC , the distribution of NE points
is separated into three regions along with the increase of the
network demand kb. First, when the network demand kb is low,
the defender does not need to monitor disallowed channels.
Consequently, the attacker could perform the attack to the
best channel (channel with low operation of PUs). Second,
when the network demand kb is medium, the attacker has a
trend of moving the attack from the best channel to the worst
channel. The reason of this trend is that the defender performs
its surveillance on the best channel due to the increase of its
spectrum demand. Third, when the network demand kb is very
high, the defender increase the surveillance rate at the both
channels. As a result, the attacker has a corresponding re-
sponse by adjusting its attacking rate on the both channels. For
each region, the strategy of defender depends on the relation
between the network demand kb and the penalty factor kC . For
a fixed penalty factor kC , the defender performs monitoring
the disallowed channel with a constant probability for each
region. In addition, the size of each region also depends on
the penalty factor kC where the last region corresponding with
high network demand kb is enlarged with penalty factor values.
The results mean that the NE strategies of the MSG game are
affected by both the penalty factor and the network demand.
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Fig. 2. The NE strategy of the MSG game for N = 2, with channel characteristics pi1 = 0.2 and pi2 = 0.5.
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Fig. 3. The differences on defender’s expected payoffs: (a) between NE and
uniform surveillance (UniS) strategies, (b) between NE and random (Rand)
strategies.
We conclude that in order to reduce the influence of PUEA,
the CRNs should set a high penalty.
Figure 3 shows the differences on the defender’s expected
payoffs when the defender plays (a) NE and uniform surveil-
lance strategies, and (b) NE and random strategies. The uni-
form surveillance strategy means that all disallowed channels
are uniformly monitored, and the random strategy means that
all possible actions are randomly performed.
For the low network demand kb or the low penalty kC ,
the monitoring gain is smaller than the monitoring cost. If
the defender performs to surveillance the disallowed channels,
its expected payoff will be a negative value. For the high
penalty factor kC or the high network demand kb, the NE
strategy is the BR for the defender. Therefore, the defender’s
expected payoff at NE strategy is higher than those at the other
strategies. We concluded that the NE strategy is efficient to
mitigate the selfish PUEA in multi-channel CRNs.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the multi-channel surveillance process to
deal with the selfish PUEA in multi-channel cognitive radio
networks. Performing a multi-channel surveillance process on
disallowed channels help to identify selfish PUEA attacker.
The relation between attack strategies and the surveillance
process has been formulated through an extensive-form game.
Sequence representation method has been used for obtaining
Nash equilibrium. The numerical results have showed the
influence of the network demand and the penalty factor on
controlling NE strategies and the effectiveness of using NE on
mitigating PUEA. Besides, the introduced method has a more
efficient computational time compared to the conventional one.
We will generalize this method to deal with other PUEA
attacker types such as malicious and unknown-attacking type.
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